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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine this thought experiment: 
 A new procedural rule caps the raw number of judicial opinions that an 
appeals court can publish every year. The new cap is roughly half of what 
the court was publishing before.  
As this court’s judges begin to triage their opinion-writing, which types 
of opinions will they continue publishing? Which will they give up? Will 
the court more readily forgo publishing its affirmances, which are often 
“easy cases”? Will it nonetheless strive to continue publishing its reversals, 
which are often “hard cases”—and which offer the lower courts more 
urgently needed guidance? 
Once the rule takes effect, less case law will be made—but which topics 
will be most affected? Which subject areas will turn out to be higher or 
lower priorities for this common law court? 
Strange as it might seem, such a policy shock in fact occurred. In an 
unprecedented move,1 the Illinois Supreme Court in the mid-1990s imposed 
hard caps on the state’s appeals courts, drastically reducing the number of 
opinions they could publish,2 while also narrowing the formal criteria for 
 
1 See Randall Samborn, Judges in Illinois Told To Be Brief, NAT’L L.J., July 18, 1994, at A6 (“In 
an effort to stanch the flow of an ‘avalanche’ of state appellate court opinions, the Illinois Supreme 
Court has ordered what appears to be unprecedented limits on the number of published opinions 
and their lengths . . . . Staff members from the . . . National Center for State Courts and the 
American Bar Association’s Judicial Administration Division said they believed the limits are the 
first of their kind.”). 
2 Among the five regional districts of the Illinois intermediate appellate courts, as Part II 
details, the new caps amounted to cuts ranging from roughly one-third to one-half of prior output. 
In the aggregate, the five districts’ actual reductions amounted to roughly one-half of prior output. 
For a comparison of these new limits for each of the five districts and their typical prior output, 
see infra Table 1. The accompanying discussion also explains the nonpublication options available 
to the court and how the criteria for publication changed. 
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opinions to qualify for publication.3 As Part I describes, the high court 
explained that the amendment’s purpose was to reduce the “avalanche of 
opinions emanating from [the] Appellate Court,”4 which was causing legal 
research to become “unnecessarily burdensome, difficult and costly.”5 
This unusual and sudden policy shift offers the chance to observe the 
priorities of a common law court in its production of published opinions. 
The method we introduce here can be seen as a sort of revealed-preferences 
approach:6 when forced to choose, which types of opinions were these 
courts more likely to continue publishing, and which types were they more 
likely to abandon?7  
Our method, which seems straightforward, has turned out to reveal 
more than we expected: it has uncovered more than the simple priorities 
raised in the thought experiment above. One especially surprising pattern 
forces us to develop new theories about how higher-level judicial priorities—
such as a concern for outward appearances—compete for influence over 
judicial choices. 
 
3 According to the new formal criteria for publishing an opinion, whose implementation 
coincided with the imposition of the numerical caps, “[a] case may be disposed of by an opinion 
only when the majority of the panel deciding the case determines that . . . (1) the decision 
establishes a new rule of law or modifies, explains, or criticizes an existing rule of law; or (2) the 
decision resolves, creates, or avoids an apparent conflict of authority within the Appellate Court.” 
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 23(a). By contrast, the prior criteria had also allowed publication of an opinion 
when the case was of sufficient public interest, contributed to the legal literature in explaining 
historical developments, or was accompanied by a concurrence or dissent. This change is discussed 
further in Part I. 
4 Illinois Supreme Court Administrative Order, M.R. No. 10343 (1994) (Bilandic, C.J., 
writing in support).  
5 Id. (Heiple, J., writing in support). 
6 If one were to spin out the revealed preferences metaphor, one might say that we are 
observing the impact of a budget shock. To take the metaphor further, one might also imagine 
that the relative prices of various types of opinions could have changed due to the shift in 
emphasis in the formal criteria for publication under the new rule. Details about the change in 
formal criteria are presented below. See infra notes 48-51 and accompanying text. 
7 To our knowledge, this is the first study to make use of such an empirical strategy. But, of 
course, the general literature on judges’ publication decisions is vast, ranging from firsthand 
judicial accounts to empirical studies, which even include empirical studies conducted by judges 
themselves. For a small sampling of such work, see generally FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL: 
COURTS, LAWYERING, AND JUDGING 154-80 (1994); LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & 
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND 
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE (2013); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL 
COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 75-82 (1996); Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. 
Posner, What Do Federal District Judges Want?: An Analysis of Publications, Citations, and Reversals, 
28 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 518 (2012); Mitu Gulati & C.M.A. McCauliff, On Not Making Law, 61 L. 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 157 (1998); Carl Tobias, Anastasoff, Unpublished Opinions, and Federal 
Appellate Justice, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1171 (2002); David C. Vladeck & Mitu Gulati, Judicial 
Triage: Reflections on the Debate over Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1667 (2005). 
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We began by constructing two datasets. As Part II explains, the first 
dataset contains all cases available on Westlaw from the five districts of the 
Illinois appeals courts in the time period selected for study.8 Second, to 
reduce concerns about possible effects of the changing composition of the 
courts over time, we identified a stable sample of judges who were members 
of these courts for at least three years before the policy change and who 
continued to sit for at least three years afterwards—that is, for the entirety 
of the study period. Our second dataset consists only of opinions authored 
by these judges.9  
The new opinion-writing constraints hit these courts hard. All five 
districts immediately complied, dropping below their respective caps. 
Figures 1 through 10 show these dramatic drops both in the aggregate and in 
each district.10 This sudden curtailment of publication is also clearly seen in 
our stable sample of judges.11 To see which types of cases the judges 
prioritized for publication, we divided the data between civil and criminal 
cases, as well as between reversals and affirmances,12 and compared the 
numbers and rates of published opinions among the resulting groups.13  
 
8 These Westlaw cases contain both those that were officially designated for publication by 
the courts and those that were not. (Virtually all of the latter are entries in “tables” of the reporter 
or very short descriptions of a case outcome.) Our data are more fully described in Part II. 
9 See infra Part II. Our use of this stable sample of judges reduces—but, of course, does not 
eliminate—the possible influence of the courts’ changing composition. These judges decided cases 
in panels and were surely influenced by each other’s work in other ways as well. Still, we find the 
close similarity of the results in our full sample and in this more selective sample reassuring. 
10 In reporting our principal findings, we emphasize those patterns that seem to be common 
across districts, despite their many differences. But we also take care to identify those districts 
whose reactions have unique characteristics—keeping in mind that the districts vary in their case 
compositions, baseline reversal and publication rates, administrative practices, and so forth. 
11 See infra Figures 3, 5. As with variations among districts, of course, variations among 
judges’ reactions to the new rules and caps were also to be expected. Consider one federal judge’s 
rather sharp comment that “[s]ome appellate judges like to see their own deathless prose in 
published format, while others much prefer the unpublished mode, and are perfectly happy with 
assignments to put out decisions for nonpublication by the dozens.” Philip Nichols, Jr., Selective 
Publication of Opinions: One Judge’s View, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 909, 924 (1986). But the aggregate 
patterns in this stable sample of judges are strikingly similar to those in the full population. 
12 Other breakdowns or categories are of course possible. This initial study, however, focuses 
on these fundamental binaries. For an example of the finer categories that may be identifiable 
based on textual parsing of the opinions, consider the data we present about a special set of 
government agency cases (roughly speaking, workers’ compensation cases) in Appendix Figure 4. 
We discuss these cases in Part III. 
13 That is, we divided the datasets into the four categories of criminal reversals, criminal 
affirmances, civil affirmances, and civil reversals. The impact of the policy shock on publications, 
broken down into these four categories, can be seen in Figure 4, as well as in Table 2 and 
Appendix Table 2. Part II provides further detail regarding how we identified the categories. 
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We observe first that as these courts were forced to triage, they seemed 
to favor civil cases over criminal cases—cutting back the publication of 
opinions less among civil cases than among criminal cases. Although the 
districts varied in their reactions,14 the decline in the number of published 
criminal opinions (a sixty-three percent drop) was greater in the aggregate 
than for civil opinions (a forty-four percent drop).15 A natural interpretation 
is that a greater share of criminal than of civil opinions were deemed 
sufficiently low priority to be dropped from publication: as the bar for 
publication was raised—whether by the caps, by the new formal criteria, or 
by both—the share of formerly publishable opinions disqualified by this 
higher bar was greater among criminal than among civil cases.16 
One might have guessed to the contrary (as we did) that these courts 
would instead favor criminal cases for publication,17 given the importance of 
public reasoning in decisions about criminal punishment.18 But predicting 
the opposite would also have been sensible: criminal appeals may raise 
 
14 One worry of the Illinois bench and bar about the new opinion-writing limits was that 
different judicial districts might favor or abandon different categories of cases: “What if the judges 
in the Fourth and Fifth Districts decided that the only cases which would presumptively merit 
opinion would be in the areas of product liability or [the Federal Employers Liability Act?] If the 
Second District, likewise, decided that [eminent domain cases] . . . would have presumptive 
priority, what happens to the remainder? Practicing attorneys could easily see all of the law in a 
particular area coming from one part of the state.” David R. Parkinson, More Comments on the 
Recent Page and Rule 23 Ordered Opinions, ILL. ST. B. ASS’N CRIM. JUST. NEWSL. (Ill. State Bar 
Ass’n, Springfield, Ill.), Dec. 1994, at 2, 3. Of course, the districts’ reactions might also vary 
simply due to the differing natures of both the criminal and civil dockets that one might expect 
between a densely populated urban district such as the First District, which covers much of 
Chicago, and a more rural district such as the Fifth District.  
15 See infra Table 2, which reports the criminal–civil comparison for all five districts 
combined, as well as for each individual district. The two most populous districts—the First 
District and Second District, which together cover much of Chicago and its northern suburbs—
showed a large gap between criminal and civil opinions in terms of percentage drops in opinions, 
with criminal opinions dropping more than civil. So did the Fifth District, which is one of the 
three smaller districts. But the remaining two—the Third District and the Fourth District—
showed small gaps. None of the districts showed a gap in favor of criminal opinions. 
16 Our further analysis will complicate this seemingly simple interpretation, and a more 
subtle and refined account is offered in the Conclusion. 
17 Such an expectation would also align with the formal precedence that criminal appeals are 
often afforded in the internal procedures of appellate courts, such as in scheduling or in the 
granting of oral argument. Indeed, Illinois adheres to such a rule. See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 611(a) 
(stating that in the “sequence and manner of calling cases for oral argument . . . priority shall be 
given to appeals in criminal cases over appeals in civil cases”). 
18 Consider Judge Patricia Wald’s complaint two decades ago: “When I came onto the D.C. 
Circuit in 1979, we rarely if ever disposed of a criminal appeal without an opinion; now we handle 
72% that way.” Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1374 (1995). Her comment suggests both that criminal appeals were once 
thought to be inherently publication-worthy and that these practices or habits can change 
dramatically over time. 
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similar or repetitive issues, while the civil docket consists of a more varied 
portfolio of areas of law, each needing an independent body of precedent.19 
Also, there may have been a wider range of acceptable reasons to publish 
criminal opinions before the rule change than after the new rules narrowed 
the official criteria for publication.20  
We encountered something more puzzling, however, in our comparisons 
of reversals and affirmances. As one might have expected, these courts 
seemed to favor reversals over affirmances; we observed greater drops in the 
publication of opinions affirming lower court decisions than of opinions 
reversing the lower court.21 By virtually any account, reversals should be 
more deserving of publication: they often raise harder issues (in fact, 
different judges have already disagreed), and they address issues on which 
the lower courts evidently need guidance.22 No doubt many affirmances also 
lay down useful precedent, and some reversals fix fact-bound errors of little 
interest to case law.23 But it would not have surprised us to see the number 
 
19 The view that criminal appeals tend not to raise precedent-worthy issues has been echoed 
by at least one federal appellate judge. See Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 
60 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 178 (1999) (“Roughly twenty-five percent of the cases on the Sixth Circuit 
docket are federal criminal cases of some sort, and another thirty percent are various forms of 
federal and state prisoner petitions. What can we add on these subjects that is new and 
worthwhile?” (footnote omitted)). 
20 We emphasize that the data do not help us distinguish between two possible (and perhaps 
coexisting or complementary) reasons for a court to cut back on publication in a given category of 
cases. First, some opinions may no longer merit publication due to the generally higher bar. 
Second, some specific opinions may no longer merit publication because the new criteria now 
exclude the rationale that would have supported publication before. For instance, the public 
importance of the case was a reason for publication recognized under the old Rule 23 but not 
under the new Rule 23. 
21 To be clear, the findings described here are about published reversals and affirmances—that 
is, about the number of reversals and affirmances chosen for publication before and after the policy 
shock. These statements are not about the overall rates of reversal and affirmance, which the data 
show not to be systematically affected by the rule changes. We discuss the implications of this 
contrast below and in Part III. 
22 While not universal, the presumption that reversals should be published is common 
among appellate courts. In fact, reversal is sometimes listed as a formal criterion for publication. 
See, e.g., D.C. CIR. R. 36(c)(2)(F) (stating that a decision will be published if, among other 
reasons, “it reverses a published agency or district court decision, or affirms a decision of the 
district court upon grounds different from those set forth in the district court’s published 
opinion”). Yet as one federal appellate judge has observed, “[w]hatever the rules say, the 
proportion of reversed decisions left unpublished ought to be and usually is small. However, some 
circuits seem to take joy in not publishing a very high proportion of their reversals, notably the 
Sixth.” Nichols, supra note 11, at 926. Judge Nichols’s view of the Sixth Circuit may be outdated, 
however, or at least contested. See Martin, supra note 19, at 186-87 (“Whether a decision is a 
reversal does weigh into the calculus, and we produce a relatively low number of unpublished 
reversals . . . . It is fair to say that reversals or opinions with dissents are almost always published.”). 
23 Cf. Frank M. Coffin, Grace Under Pressure: A Call for Judicial Self-Help, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 
399, 401 (1989) (“If ways could be found to identify, with economy, which cases present merely 
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of published reversals barely budge and thereby see most of the policy’s 
impact fall on affirmances. Instead, the data show a sizeable drop in the 
publication of reversals: in the five districts taken together, less than thirty 
percent of reversals were published after the policy change, compared to 
over fifty percent before.  
Looking into this question further led us to notice a striking and 
surprising pattern, one that is found in each of the five districts, and in both 
the civil and criminal dockets. Before the policy shock, published 
affirmances greatly outnumbered published reversals24—yet when both 
collapsed under the new constraints, they tended to land at virtually the same 
level.25 Moreover, the volume of published reversals and of published 
affirmances remained roughly similar thereafter, often as if tracking each 
other. This pattern is evident in Figures 2 through 10.  
This unexpected pattern, which appears across districts and across 
categories of cases, invites hypothesis. One possibility is that the new rules 
led these courts to limit publication to mainly the “hard cases”—cases in 
which the law is indeterminate—and that such cases might be expected to 
fall roughly half as reversals and half as affirmances. Closer analysis of the 
content of these published opinions, in future work, may shed more light on 
this theory. 
But a rough balance is not all that we see: Figures 2 through 10 show in 
many time periods—across districts, across case types, and even among 
individual judges—what looks like actively managed numerical matching of 
published reversals and affirmances. And tellingly, when published 
affirmances and reversals are not tracking each other, affirmances outnumber 
reversals among published opinions much more often than the other way 
around. And so the “hard cases” theory cannot be a complete explanation, 
given these additional patterns.26 
The story that seems most plausible is that these courts, in choosing 
which opinions to publish, did so with an eye toward appearances: even as 
 
issues of error correction and which involve ‘lawmaking’ questions, appellate courts could easily 
assign the former to a summary form of disposition and reserve the latter for extended analysis 
and discussion.”). 
24 The only exception was in the Fifth District, which began with affirmances already very 
close to the number of reversals. See Section III.C (discussing data from the Fifth District). 
Indeed, the number of affirmances closely tracked the number of reversals even before the policy shock. 
25 The drop in affirmances varied greatly among the districts, as one might have expected, 
thus making the regularity of the post-shock matching landings (of the number of published 
reversals and affirmances) all the more remarkable. See Figures 6-10. 
26 Even if some version of a “hard cases” account might allow for more affirmances than 
reversals to result (among published opinions), it is not obvious how such a story would also 
generate the periods of close tracking that we do observe. 
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they were forced to cut back on publishing affirmances, they did not want to 
publish noticeably more reversals than affirmances. They were seeking to 
avoid creating the impression that the trial courts were getting it wrong 
more often than right.27 
In fact, by managing the balance of visible reversals and affirmances, the 
appellate courts were actually countering a misimpression. The true reversal 
rate was lower than what outside observers might infer based on only the 
published opinions. The trial courts were in fact doing a better job than it 
might have publicly seemed. 
We thus suspect that we are seeing a sort of higher-order preference, or 
super-priority, at work. In Part IV, we elaborate on possible motivations, 
including managing perceptions of the quality of the state’s trial courts and 
avoiding undue embarrassment for the trial bench. While it is by now a 
familiar insight that trial judges may be reversal-averse, here we may be seeing 
an appellate court show a sort of a reciprocal concern: reproach-aversion.28 
The data suggest not only the presence of such a super-priority for these 
courts,29 but also how this concern for appearances interacts with their other 
higher-order concerns. A hierarchy among super-priorities becomes evident 
when we compare the patterns of outcomes among all cases (published or 
not) with the patterns among only the published opinions. The data show 
that the overall reversal and affirmance numbers remain stable despite the 
policy shock, even when the numbers of published reversals and affirmances 
change dramatically. Compare Figure 2 with Appendix Figure 2. This 
contrast is notable because, in theory, these courts could have managed 
appearances in a different and troubling way: by changing the outcomes of 
some cases slated for publication from reversal to affirmance. Instead, it 
seems that these courts chose simply to publish more of the affirmances.  
To fix ideas, imagine a contest among three stylized super-priorities: 
first, reaching the desired substantive outcomes, or “accuracy” for short; 
second, “appearances,” as already described; and third, “selectivity,” or 
publishing only opinions useful for the case law (as the Illinois Supreme 
Court instructed the appeals courts to do). The data suggest that these 
 
27 It is common among observers to assess the quality of a court’s work by its apparent 
performance on appellate review, even if such inferences have obvious shortcomings. See infra note 134. 
28 One might see this as a vertical cousin of horizontal “dissent aversion.” See generally Lee 
Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Why (and When) Judges Dissent: A Theoretical 
and Empirical Analysis, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 101 (2011) (describing “dissent aversion” among 
appeals judges). On “reversal aversion” among trial judges, see generally Choi et al., supra note 7. 
29 One cannot infer, of course, that any other courts—or even these same courts at a different 
time—would hold this same super-priority or give it the same weight. 
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courts valued accuracy and appearances over selectivity. And they sustained 
the first two by sacrificing the third.  
One upshot of this ordering is that there may have been spillovers 
among the cases in these courts, a possibility that the Conclusion explores. 
In brief, a court’s decision to publish a reversal may have depended on 
which opinions it had already published so far that year, and on whether 
more affirmances can be published—concerns unrelated to the true 
publication-worthiness of the case at hand. 
A further lesson emerges in addressing a critical question about our 
assumptions: why should outward appearances be assumed to depend 
mainly on published opinions? The short answer is that a vast gap in 
visibility existed between published and unpublished decisions from the 
Illinois appeals courts during the time period that we studied (quite unlike 
today’s easy access to so-called unpublished opinions).30 Neither the name 
of the trial court judge nor the reasoning of the appeals court was reported 
publicly in unpublished decisions; the bound reporters and electronic 
services generally stated little more than the case name and the disposition, 
usually in a one-line table entry.31 This format not only obscured the nature 
of the error leading to a reversal or remand, but also gave outside observers 
practically no reason to consult those tables in the first place.32  
Such barebones reporting of unpublished decisions virtually ensured 
that outside perceptions would be based mainly on published opinions.33 
 
30 An asymmetry in salience between published and unpublished opinions may persist even 
in an era in which unpublished decisions are more readily accessible. Consider a recent episode in 
which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed several decisions of the Social 
Security Administration (SSA) by published opinion while diverting its affirmances of SSA 
decisions to unpublished dispositions. This lopsidedness apparently affected public perception of 
the SSA’s work. Debra Cassens Weiss, Posner Opinion Takes Aim at Denial of Disability Benefits; Is It 
a 7th Circuit Trend?, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 21, 2014), available at http://www.abajournal.com/news/ 
article/posner_opinion_takes_aim_at_denial_of_disability_benefits_is_it_a_7th_circu. 
31 Other courts, including the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, have used 
different forms of such truly unpublished opinions. See Gulati & McCauliff, supra note 7, at 162 
(describing the Third Circuit’s “Judgment Order,” which is also termed “without-comment 
disposition”). 
32 For these reasons, moreover, we think that our context also departs from the folk wisdom 
about federal courts today that it can be more embarrassing for a judge to be reversed in an 
unpublished decision than in a published opinion. A combination of factors about the unpublished 
decisions in our context—particularly not naming the trial judge and not inviting interest from 
observers—probably meant that the Illinois trial judges may well have preferred an unpublished 
reversal. We discuss such collegiality concerns more fully in Section III.D. 
33 It is possible, of course, that some sophisticated observers would recognize that little can 
be learned about overall reversal rates (save perhaps an upper bound) from observing only the 
published opinions; our appearances-based account supposes that there are nonetheless important 
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Meanwhile, the true reversal rate, including unpublished decisions, 
remained obscure.34 It was thanks to this strong asymmetry of salience 
between published and unpublished decisions that these courts could 
manage outward appearances without also distorting the actual outcomes of 
cases. It is common for researchers to note that published opinions are not 
representative of the population of cases—but remarkably, in this episode, 
the courts themselves seem to be making use of that fact. 
In other words, what we may be seeing are common law courts using the 
principal “medium” of judicial expression—the production of texts of 
varying formats and visibilities—to convey information beyond the content 
of individual opinions. The judicial medium may thus be better understood 
more broadly, as allowing courts to signal to multiple audiences (with 
signals of varying shades) also through the macro characteristics of the 
corpus of its decisions. 
I. THE POLICY SHOCK 
Before turning to a closer examination of the effects of the Illinois 
Supreme Court’s unprecedented limitations on the state’s appellate courts, a 
brief history of the Illinois rules concerning the publication of judicial 
opinions helps set the stage.  
A. Earlier Forms of Decision 
Since 1972, the disposition of appellate cases in Illinois’s state judiciary 
has been governed by various versions of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23. 
As originally promulgated, Rule 23 provided the appellate courts with two 
options for the disposition of cases: a circuit court could publish a 
traditional precedential opinion, or for a small set of cases that were easily 
affirmed,35 a nonprecedential “memorandum opinion” could suffice. But 
 
audiences (as perceived by the appeals judges) who might not so fully discount (or who the judges 
think might not discount) the informational value of the visible evidence. 
34 As noted above and evident in the Appendix, the overall reversal rate is stable throughout 
the time period of our study and was unaffected by the policy shock. 
35 Memorandum opinions could be used for cases in which no error of law appears, an 
opinion would have no precedential value, and one or more of the following circumstances exists: 
(a) a judgment in a civil case is not against the manifest weight of the evidence; (b) a judgment in 
a civil case entered upon allowance of a motion for directed verdict should be affirmed because all 
of the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the appellant, so overwhelmingly 
favors the appellee that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand; (c) in a 
criminal case the evidence is not so unsatisfactory as to leave a reasonable doubt as to defendant’s 
guilt; or (d) the decision of an administrative body or agency reviewed under the provisions of the 
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even for those cases where the rule might apply, memorandum opinions 
(known colloquially as Rule 23 orders) were rarely issued, and so the court 
amended the rule in 1975 to encourage greater use of the alternative form.36 
The 1975 amendment left the two disposition forms intact, but 
“broaden[ed] considerably the power of the appellate courts to dispose of 
cases without opinion.”37 Under the revised rules, opinions were reserved 
for cases that met one of five outlined criteria;38 in cases that did not meet 
this standard, the court was to issue a written order that “succinctly state[d] 
the facts, the contentions of the parties, the reasons for the decision, the 
disposition, and the names of the participating judges.”39 These short-form 
dispositions were explicitly deemed “not precedential” and were not to be 
published.40  
This second iteration of the Illinois rule was consistent with similar 
rules that governed the vast majority of state appellate courts41 and that 
were embroiled in a controversy regarding the propriety of such 
nonprecedential dispositions.42 In Illinois, that controversy came to a head 
in 1983, when the Illinois State Bar Association, lamenting the loss of 
 
Administrative Review Act and confirmed by the circuit court is not against the manifest weight 
of the evidence. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 23 (Committee Comments). 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 The five criteria were (1) the case involves an important new legal issue or modifies or 
questions an existing rule of law; (2) the decision considers a conflict or apparent conflict of 
authority within the appellate court; (3) the decision is of substantial public interest; (4) the 
opinion constitutes a significant contribution to legal literature by either an historical review of 
law or by describing legislative history; or (5) the case included a concurring or dissenting opinion 
(unless the panel unanimously decided to forgo publication). ILL. SUP. CT. R. 23 (Historical and 
Statutory Notes). 
39 Id.  
40 Id. 
41 See generally Melissa M. Serfass & Jessie L. Cranford, Federal and State Court Rules 
Governing Publication and Citation of Opinions, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 251 (2001) (explaining 
and analyzing “the basic guidelines for publishing opinions and citing unpublished opinions in the 
federal courts of appeals and the appellate courts of the fifty states and the District of Columbia”). 
See also Keith H. Beyler & Clarold L. Britton, Supreme Court Rule 23: An Empirical Study, 76 ILL. 
B.J. 324, 324 (1988) (explaining that “[t]he great majority of states having intermediate appellate 
courts have adopted rules that limit the publication and use of the decisions of those courts”). 
42 See, e.g., Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish if They Publish? Or Does 
the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater Threat?, 44 AM. 
U. L. REV. 757, 768-80 (1995) (arguing for the importance of opinion publication); Robert J. 
Martineau, Restrictions on Publication and Citation of Judicial Opinions: A Reassessment, 28 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 119, 128-145 (1994) (same). For later work on the matter, see, for example, Danny J. 
Boggs & Brian P. Brooks, Unpublished Opinions and the Nature of Precedent, 4 GREEN BAG 2D 17, 
23 (2000) (arguing that the contemporary controversy surrounding unpublished opinions is rooted 
in a failure to distinguish between two kinds of precedent in opinions: analogical and rule-setting). 
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precedent, called for the repeal of Rule 23.43 Responding to such public 
criticism of the increased use of Rule 23 orders, the courts pulled back after 
1983.44 Despite the courts’ adjustments to their practice, the controversy 
persisted, and in 1988, the Illinois State Bar Association called on the state’s 
supreme court to amend the rule to expand the categories of cases for which 
opinions were appropriate and to increase the utility of memorandum 
dispositions.45 Although little came of those proposed amendments, the 
Illinois Supreme Court did decide to enact far-reaching changes to Rule 23 
six years later, on June 27, 1994.46  
B. The New Constraints 
The resulting amendment took Rule 23 in precisely the opposite 
direction of the amendments proposed by the Illinois State Bar Association 
six years earlier. The 1994 amendment—which in effect “rewrote the 
rule”47—enacted two main substantive changes. First, the amendment 
strengthened the “presumption against disposing of Appellate Court cases 
by full, published opinions” by significantly constraining (and not 
expanding, as had been hoped) the range of criteria for publication.48 
Second, the revised rule created a new form of nonprecedential opinion. 
In addition to the familiar Rule 23 orders, the court invented an even 
shorter disposition form: the “summary order.”49 The class of cases for 
which summary orders were appropriate was analogous to (but larger than) 
 
43 Beyler & Britton, supra note 41, at 325 n.3 (noting Res. of Ill. St. Bar Ass’n, 1983 Annual 
Meeting ( June 24, 1983) (Agenda Item IX.A)). 
44 Id. at 326 chart 3. 
45 See id. at 332 (noting the text of the proposed amendments). The proposed amendments 
would have expanded the categories of cases for which publication was appropriate, made 
unpublished decisions reviewable by the Illinois Supreme Court, and allowed parties to seek 
publication of a decision. Id. The only part of this proposal that seems to have been adopted is the 
provision allowing a party to move the court to designate a decision for publication. See ILL. SUP. 
CT. R. 23 (Historical and Statutory Notes). 
46 Id. (Historical Notes); Illinois Supreme Court Administrative Order, M.R. No. 10343 (1994). 
47 ILL. SUP. CT. R. 23 (Historical Notes). 
48 Id. (Committee Comments). The amendment removed three of the five categories of 
opinions that the rule had deemed suitable for publication. (Recall that the Illinois State Bar 
Association had proposed expanding the criteria to include seven categories of opinions.) The 
amended rule provided that  
[a] case may be disposed of by an opinion only when a majority of the panel deciding 
the case determines that . . . (1) the decision establishes a new rule of law or  
modifies, explains or criticizes an existing rule of law; or (2) the decision resolves, 
creates, or avoids an apparent conflict of authority within the Appellate Court. 
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 23(a). 
49 ILL. SUP. CT. R. 23(c). 
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the set of cases for which Rule 23 orders were originally designated in the 
1972 version of the rule.50 These summary orders were to consist only of “a 
statement describing the nature of the case and the dispositive issues without 
a discussion of the facts,” “a citation to controlling precedent” and a single 
statement announcing the judgment of the court.51 
The Supreme Court saved its most inventive—and most jarring—
procedural changes not for the amended text of Rule 23 but for an 
accompanying administrative order known as M.R. No. 10343. Invoking its 
“general administrative and supervisory authority” over the state’s lower 
courts,52 the Supreme Court imposed two new limits on the Illinois 
appellate courts that “raised eyebrows” and provoked “nationwide” debate.53 
First, the administrative order restricted the maximum length of any 
published opinion.54 In addition to encouraging shorter non-precedential 
dispositions through the introduction of summary orders, the new order 
mandated that published “[o]pinions shall not exceed 20 pages in length, 
excluding any concurring or dissenting opinions, which shall not exceed 5 
pages in length,” and included concomitant page, margin, and font size 
restrictions.55 
More strikingly, the administrative order buttressed the presumption 
against publication through first-of-their-kind caps on published opinions.56 
 
50 The 1994 amended rule provided that  
[a] summary order may be utilized when: (1) the Appellate Court lacks jurisdiction; 
(2) the disposition is clearly controlled by case law precedent, statute, or rules of 
court; (3) the appeal is moot; (4) the issues involve no more than an application of 
well-settled rules to recurring fact situations; (5) the opinion or findings of fact and 
conclusions of law of the trial court or agency adequately explain the decision; (6) no 
error of law appears on the record; (7) the trial court or agency did not abuse its  
discretion; or (8) the record does not demonstrate that the decision of the trier of 
fact is against the manifest weight of the evidence. 
Id. By contrast, see the 1972 version of Rule 23, which is quoted supra note 35. 
51 ILL. SUP. CT. R. 23(c)(i)-(iii) (emphasis added). 
52 Illinois Supreme Court Administrative Order, M.R. No. 10343 (1994). 
53 Beth C. Boggs, Survey of Illinois Law: Civil Procedure, 19 S. ILL. U. L.J. 683, 699-700 (1995). 
54 Illinois Supreme Court Administrative Order, M.R. No. 10343 (1994). These page limits 
should have no first-order effect on the interpretation of our observations in the present study, 
which are based on the quantity limits. However, because we find the imposition of page limits to 
be a fascinating and unusual policy shock in its own right—and also because we recognize the 
possibility of secondary interactions with the quantity limits studied here—we are exploring the 
impact of these page limits in separate work. 
55 Id.  
56 See Samborn, supra note 1 (stating that the Illinois Supreme Court’s order sets “what 
appears to be unprecedented limits on the number of published opinions and their lengths”); see 
also Mark Hansen, Illinois Caps Appellate Opinions, 80 A.B.A. J. 36, 36 (Dec. 1994) (explaining that 
Illinois’s cap on opinions is “the only measure of its kind in the nation”). 
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Beginning July 1, 1994, each of Illinois’s five appellate districts faced a limit 
on the number of opinions it could publish annually.57 The Fourth District, 
for example, was limited to publishing only 150 precedential opinions58 
(compared to the 297 opinions it published in the 1993 calendar year). Table 1 
provides this comparison for each of the five appellate districts.59 In total, 
the new limits capped the judicial output of the Illinois appellate courts at 
less than two-thirds of the number of opinions published in 1993. 
 
Table 1: 1993 Opinions and Opinion Limits, All Districts 
 
Published Opinions in 
CY1993 
Annual Limit Beginning 
July 1, 1994 
1st District 1011 750
2nd District 430 250
3rd District 272 150
4th District 297 150
5th District 186 150 
 
The severity of the cuts was no accident. A desire for drastic reductions 
in the number of published opinions in fact motivated the new restrictions. 
Writing in support of the amended rule and new limits, Illinois Supreme 
Court Justice Heiple noted that “[i]n 1993, the Appellate Courts of Illinois 
published 2,195 opinions. Many of these published opinions were redundant 
and lacking in precedential value.”60 Chief Justice Bilandic noted that this 
“avalanche of opinions emanating from our Appellate Court has taxed the 
capacity of the members of that court to read the opinions filed in all of the 
 
57  Illinois Supreme Court Administrative Order, M.R. No. 10343 (1994). While the new limits 
applied on an annual basis, they do not appear to have aligned to the calendar-year reporting 
periods used by the Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts. See id. (“[T]he districts of the 
Appellate Court shall be limited in the number of opinions each may file annually commencing 
July 1, 1994 . . . .”). 
58 Id.  
59 The figures for the first column in Table 1 are drawn from ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE ILL. 
COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS COURTS: STATISTICAL SUMMARY—1993 
[hereinafter 1993 ANNUAL REPORT].  
60 Illinois Supreme Court Administrative Order, M.R. No. 10343 (1994) (Heiple, J., writing 
in support). While Justice Heiple stated that the appellate courts issued 2195 opinions in 1993, the 
summed total of the first column of Table 1 yields 2196 opinions. This is due to a discrepancy in 
the numbers reported in the 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 59. One table in that report 
shows a total of 1010 opinions in the First District for that year, whereas another table shows a 
total of 1011 opinions in the First District. Id. at 108-09. We rely on the latter table because it 
provides more detailed information. 
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appellate districts.”61 Justice Heiple further added that this volume was 
making legal research “unnecessarily burdensome” for lawyers, contributing 
to increased litigation expenses.62 In the view of the supporting justices, 
“[t]he new Supreme Court Rule 23 and [its] accompanying order [we]re 
modest efforts to curtail the publication of unnecessary opinions and to 
render those opinions that are published to be of readable length” in order 
to “benefit the general public and the practicing bar” and to “elevate the 
significance of . . . the appellate court.”63 
Reactions to these changes, however, were not universally sanguine. Two 
justices dissented from the new limits promulgated.64 Although they 
concurred in the addition of the summary order disposition form, Justice 
Miller, joined by Justice McMorrow, referred to the limits contained in 
M.R. No. 10343 as a “mechanical, arbitrary exercise” that was “demeaning to 
the appellate court, and to the public it serves.”65 
Appellate judges themselves were similarly split. On the matter of the 
length restrictions, some found “the page limit demeaning and chafe[d] 
under the restriction.”66 Judge Dom Rizzi of Illinois’s First District, for 
example, said flatly, “I don’t like it.”67 But Judge Anthony Scariano, also of 
the First District, suggested that the rule “may be just what we need” to 
ensure concise opinion writing.68 And Judge Calvin C. Campbell of the First 
District expressed similar sentiments, noting that “[b]revity is a virtue.”69 
Some judges were optimistic that the revised rule and the opinion limits 
would “aid the court in disposing of the many [pending] appeals.”70 Judge 
William A. Lewis of the Fifth District, for example, suggested the courts 
 
61  Illinois Supreme Court Administrative Order, M.R. No. 10343 (1994) (Bilandic, C.J., 
writing in support). 
The interaction between the new restrictions on the appellate courts and the selection of cases 
by the Illinois Supreme Court, which has discretionary jurisdiction over the majority of its docket, 
presents another substantively interesting set of questions that we are exploring in separate work. 
62 Id. (Heiple, J., writing in support). 
63 Id. 
64 Id.  
65 Id. (Miller, J., dissenting). 
66 Michael T. Reagan, Supreme Court Rule 23: The Terrain of the Debate and a Proposed 
Revision, 90 ILL. B.J. 180, 182 (2002). 
67 Hansen, supra note 56, at 36 (“I don’t like it, but if the supreme court passes a rule, I’m 
going to follow it.”). 
68 Id. 
69 David Heckelman, Court Limits Published Appellate Opinions by Number, Size, CHI. DAILY 
L. BULL., June 27, 1994, at 1. 
70 Id. (quoting Judge Calvin C. Campbell of the First District). 
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would be able to use the new summary order form to dispose of cases “right 
after hearing oral arguments.”71  
But other appellate judges worried about the potential for 
disproportionate impact on different areas of law. Importantly, the new 
limits did not distinguish between categories of cases. That is, beyond the 
revised formal criteria for publication, the supreme court provided no 
further signal as to the types of cases to prioritize, even though the 
appellate docket is widely varied and appeals have a variety of origins.72 As 
Judge Parkinson put it, 
What if the judges in the Fourth and Fifth Districts decided that the only 
cases which would presumptively merit opinion would be in the areas of 
product liability or [the Federal Employers Liability Act?] If the Second 
District, likewise, decided that [eminent domain cases] . . . would have 
presumptive priority, what happens to the remainder? Practicing attorneys 
could easily see all of the law in a particular area coming from one part of 
the state.73  
The local bar was also less hopeful, expressing similar concerns. The 
Chicago Council of Lawyers, a public-interest bar association, petitioned 
the Supreme Court of Illinois to reconsider the limits, contending that the 
rule would “stifle the development of the law.”74 That request was promptly 
denied, less than two weeks after it was filed.75  
 
71 Id. (quoting Judge William A. Lewis of the Fifth District).  
72 Some appeals are routed through special “divisions” created within the existing structure 
of some of the trial courts. See, e.g., ILL. 19TH J. CIR. CT. R. 1.03 (“The Chief Judge may 
designate such divisions as he, from time to time, deems necessary . . . .”). Similar provisions 
exist in the local rules of various other trial circuits in Illinois, but not all of them have exercised 
this authority. Meanwhile, other appeals, such as those from claims for workers’ compensation 
benefits, begin as administrative matters. See, e.g., James W. Chipman, The Impact of Rule 23 on 
Administrative Law: One Agency’s Perspective, 87 ILL. B.J. 428, 428-29 (1999) (noting two possible 
routes for appeals from the Property Tax Appeal Board). 
73 Parkinson, supra note 14, at 3. Judge Parkinson’s concerns echo arguments favoring the 
“percolation” of legal issues across jurisdictions. SAMUEL ESTREICHER & JOHN SEXTON, 
REDEFINING THE SUPREME COURT’S ROLE: A THEORY OF MANAGING THE FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL PROCESS 47 (1986). 
74 Hansen, supra note 56, at 36. 
75 David Bailey, Court Stands Fast on Opinion Limits, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Sept. 15, 1994, at 1 
(explaining that a petition asking for the Illinois Supreme Court to hear public comment on the 
new limits was filed by several bar associations on September 2, 1994, and denied by the court on 
September 14 of the same year). 
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C. Implementing the Change 
Despite reservations regarding the amendments, the new rules and the 
limits went into effect only three days after they were officially 
promulgated.76 
To learn how each district implemented these drastic changes, we sought 
information from representatives from each district. While we discovered 
that much of the relevant institutional memory has faded in the intervening 
twenty years, we have also been able to discern some broad contours of the 
various districts’ implementation strategies.  
Several districts employed a centralized mechanism for ensuring 
compliance with the revised rules. The Fourth and Fifth Districts, for 
example, employed a central “research division” to track progress toward the 
district’s annual limit on a regular basis (e.g., monthly or quarterly).77 As 
Judge Myerscough of the Fourth District explained, “[t]he central 
monitoring of the opinions was done by our research clerk.”78 
The First District likewise employed a central research division that 
held a fair amount of influence over the decision to publish an opinion in a 
given case.79 There, the research division was the first to examine the open 
appellate docket and identify cases that might not be suitable for 
publication.80 A randomly assigned judge, serving as case manager, could 
also deem a case unsuitable for publication.81 Such cases would, with the 
approval of the associated panel, be decided by a nonprecedential order.82 
But any panel member could request to publish an opinion instead (and 
such requests seem to have been generally respected by the other panel 
members).83  
 
76 That is not to say that the changes came as a complete surprise. The Third District, for 
example, seems to have anticipated the amendments. “Prior to the supreme court’s amendment of 
Rule 23, our court had already scrutinized the rule’s publication requirement. As a result, we 
reduced the number of opinions filed by our district from 349 in 1992 to 272 in 1993.” Michael R. 
McCuskey, Supreme Court Rule 23—Brief Comments on the New Changes, ILL. ST. B. ASS’N CRIM. 
JUST. NEWSL. (Ill. State Bar Ass’n, Springfield, Ill.), Dec. 1994, at 3, 4. 
77 E-mail from Hon. Sue Myerscough, Ill. Appellate Court, Fourth Dist., to Johanna 
Hudgens (Apr. 30, 2014, 3:45 PM) (on file with authors); Telephone Interview by Ethan 
Weinberg with John Flood, Clerk of Court, Ill. Appellate Court, Fifth Dist. (Oct. 16, 2013).  
78 E-mail from Hon. Sue Myerscough, supra note 77. 
79 Telephone Interview by Johanna Hudgens with Gino L. DiVito, Former Judge, Ill. 
Appellate Court, First Dist. (Apr. 10, 2014). 
80 Id.  
81 Id.  
82 Id.  
83 Id.  
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In contrast to the early determinations made by the research division or 
a randomly assigned judge in the First District, the Fourth District would 
decide whether to publish an opinion only after a panel had reached a 
decision on the merits or even only after the circulation of a draft opinion.84 
The Fourth District’s research division would occasionally suggest that a 
decision be published, although the ultimate decision whether to publish 
was controlled by the authoring judge and the appellate panel.85  
Unlike those districts that used a centralized office, the Third District 
divided its annual allotment of opinions among its judges, giving each an 
individual cap and making each responsible for ensuring he or she did not 
exceed the threshold.86 The chief judge apparently monitored each judge’s 
output.87 
Despite these varied approaches, it seems that all districts were 
conservative in their publication decisions relative to the new limits. That 
is, each district “over-complied” with the new caps by publishing fewer 
opinions than permitted. For instance, the First District undershot its 
annual cap of 750 opinions by publishing roughly 550 to 600 opinions per 
year. The Second District faced a cap of 250 opinions, but published only 
about 160 per year at first—before creeping up to approximately 200 
opinions after three years. The district that stands out is the Fourth 
District. Like the Third and the Fifth Districts, the Fourth faced a cap of 
150 opinions; unlike the other two, however, it did not markedly over-
comply. Rather, it hovered in the range of 130 opinions per year. This might 
suggest that the Fourth District was closer to being bound by its cap than 
the other districts were by theirs.88 
One possible explanation for the general over-compliance is that, in 
learning how to work with the new limits on publication, the districts 
initially erred on the safe side.89 A complementary hypothesis might be that 
the judges quickly internalized the newly narrowed criteria for publication 
and applied it conservatively, perhaps with an eye on the caps, resulting in a 
number of publications below the arbitrary limits set out in M.R. No. 
10343. But regardless of the underlying motivation, given what we have 
 
84 E-mail from Hon. Sue Myerscough, supra note 77. 
85 Id. 
86 Telephone Interview by Ethan Weinberg with Gist Fleshman, Clerk of Court, Ill. 
Appellate Court, Third Dist. (Oct. 16, 2013). 
87 Id. 
88 But for an alternative explanation, see infra text accompanying note 133. 
89 One might see the Second District’s upward crawl over time as an indication that it was 
learning how to properly manage the publication limit. But it may also be telling that the First, 
Third, and Fifth Districts did not show such a pattern. 
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learned from court officials about each district’s implementation protocol, 
there is no obvious relation between the method of implementation and the 
degree of over-compliance. 
II. CONSTRUCTING THE DATA 
To examine the effects of the amendments to Illinois Supreme Court 
Rule 23 and the accompanying administrative order, we constructed two 
primary datasets. The first includes all available decisions from all five 
districts during our entire study period (three years before and three years 
after the July 1, 1994 policy shock). The second includes only the opinions of 
the judges who sat on the court for our entire study period; there were 
twenty-five such judges in this stable sample. 
First, with the permission and assistance of Thomson Reuters, we 
downloaded all dispositions issued by the Illinois appellate courts during 
our study period and available on Westlaw. We analyzed these text files 
using a custom parser that collected select characteristics from each 
disposition, including case type, disposition type, caption, citation, date of 
decision, authoring judge, and outcome. This Westlaw data formed the basis 
for our two primary datasets. 
A check on the completeness of the Westlaw data is offered by the 
composite statistical data available in the Annual Reports of the Illinois 
Courts, which are prepared by the Administrative Office of the Illinois 
Courts.90 Most notably, charts of corresponding statistics drawn from the 
Annual Reports (though not reported here) mirror our own findings 
described below.91 
The comparison with the Annual Reports also shows that the cases 
available on Westlaw (and thus in our primary data) represent a fairly 
comprehensive subset of the total dispositions issued by Illinois’s appellate 
courts. For example, the 1991 Annual Report of the Illinois Courts notes 
that 2284 cases were decided by written opinion and 3380 cases were 
 
90 See 1993 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 59, at 104-13 (separate statistical summary); 
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE ILL. COURTS, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
OFFICE TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS 83-88 (contained within annual report). 
91 One advantage of using our database is that in the Annual Reports, the statistics for the 
year 1994 commingle data from before the effective date of the policy change, July 1, 1994, with 
data from afterwards. See generally ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE ILL. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT 
OF THE ILLINOIS COURTS: STATISTICAL SUMMARY—1994. More generally, our data allow us 
to use finer time periods (such as half years), whereas the Annual Reports only offer yearly data. 
And, of course, our data allow finer breakdowns along other critical dimensions, such as by 
individual judge. 
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decided by Rule 23 order.92 Thus, the appellate courts decided a total of 
5664 dispositions in 1991. The Westlaw data for that year include a total of 
5330 dispositions, or 94.1% of the courts’ self-reported total. Of those, 2007 
cases were decided by opinion (87.9% of the 2284 total opinions reported by 
the courts), and table decisions comprise the remaining 3323 dispositions (or 
98.3% of the court reported total of 3380).93 Appendix Table 1 provides a full 
comparison of these sources of data across the calendar years relevant for 
our study period. In total, the Westlaw data include 40,301 coded 
dispositions out of 43,262 registered in the Annual Reports, or 93.1% of the 
reported total.94  
Because the amendment to Rule 23 took effect on July 1, 1994, we used 
the date of each disposition to divide our Westlaw data into half-year 
periods and examined the three years on either side of the amendment.95 
Thus, we examined all available dispositions issued between July 1, 1991, and 
June 30, 1997.  
In addition to relying on the complete data for all available cases in all 
districts, we also created a second dataset. This dataset, which comprises 
only those opinions that were issued by a “stable” sample of judges, is a 
subset of our Westlaw data. In our analysis of each opinion downloaded via 
Westlaw, we recorded the date of the decision and the authoring judge.96 
Using this information, we were able to determine which judges were active 
during our entire study period.97 We identified twenty-five judges who 
issued opinions throughout our full study period98—that is, who issued at 
 
92 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE ILL. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS 
COURTS—1991, at 71.  
93 The Westlaw dataset treats Rule 23 orders and summary orders equivalently. We use the 
term “table decision” to refer to both collectively, because the outcome is recorded in the table by 
the reporter. 
94 Although we obtained 40,301 total dispositions from Westlaw, our net sample consists of 
34,446 dispositions, because we excluded dispositions issued outside of the three years 
immediately before the policy change and the three years immediately after. That is, the net 
sample excludes the first and last six months of data for the years at issue. 
95 By contrast, the Annual Reports provide aggregate statistics only on a calendar-year basis. 
As a result, the 1994 Report commingles data that predate the amendments with data that post-
date them. Our figures report 1994 data predating the amendments as 1994H1 and data post-
dating them as 1994H2 (and we use similar H1 and H2 notation for all half-year intervals during 
our study period). 
96 Authoring judge information was available only for opinions, and not for unpublished 
dispositions. 
97 Using this stable sample of judges reduces concerns about composition effects due to 
changing membership on the Illinois appellate courts, including shifts in the political compositions 
of these courts (although we recognize, of course, that even the stable set of judges would be 
sitting on panels with new colleagues).  
98 Out of a total of 101 judges. 
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least one opinion in each of the six half-year periods prior to the rule 
change and in each of the six half-year periods after the change. We then 
cross-checked this list against the lists of active judges in the Annual 
Reports to verify our inferences. We were thus able to construct a second 
dataset consisting of the 4350 opinions that were authored by judges whose 
tenures encompass our entire study period.99  
III. REVEALING PRIORITIES 
Changing the rules for the publication of decisions had an immediate 
effect. Figure 1 shows that all the districts in Illinois, combined, published 
983 opinions in the first half of 1994. In the second half of that year, that 
number was cut by more than half—to 453 opinions.100 
 
Figure 1: Number of Published Opinions, All Districts 
 
This stark drop in the number of published opinions was not due to an 
overall decline in cases decided, a number which actually increased slightly 
after the rule change.101 Nor could it be due to changes in the rate at which 
 
99 This is slightly more than fifty percent of the 8659 total opinions that were issued during 
our study period.  
100 We obtain similar results using data from our stable sample of judges, as well as the 
Annual Reports of the Illinois Courts.  
101 See infra Appendix Figure 1. One can imagine reasons why: for example, opinions are 
costly to write; thus, as judges began to write fewer and shorter opinions after the rule change, 
they may have had additional time to address more cases. 
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trial court decisions were appealed, given that these rates of appeal 
remained stable during the study period.102  
The rule change also does not appear to have had any noticeable impact 
in the merits outcomes of cases. That is, the overall rate of reversals and rate 
of affirmances remained steady (counting both published and unpublished 
decisions), with no indication of any disruption at the time of the policy 
shock.103 The rates of published reversals and affirmances are, however, an 
entirely different story. 
 
102 The rate of civil appeals was essentially unchanged; the rate of criminal appeals declined 
very slightly over the study period, but did so steadily, without any unusual deviations at the time 
of the policy change. 
103 See Appendix Figure 2. Here and throughout our findings, a reversal refers to any change 
to the trial court’s decision, including remands and reversals-in-part. See Jon O. Newman, A Study 
of Appellate Reversals, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 629, 632 (1992) (using the same approach in a 
quantitative study by a federal appeals judge). 
  
2015] Judicial Priorities 1741 
 
Table 2: Change in Published Opinions by Case Type 
  Before After Changes 
All Districts Criminal 2154 790 -63.3% 
Civil  3677 2038 -44.6% 
 
1st District Criminal 956 372 -61.1% 
Civil  1613 1093 -32.2% 
 
2nd District Criminal 436 143 -67.2% 
Civil 653 344 -47.3% 
 
3rd District Criminal 291 91 -68.7% 
Civil 457 174 -61.9% 
 
4th District Criminal 284 129 -54.6% 
Civil 540 250 -53.7% 
 
5th District Criminal 187 55 -70.6% 
Civil 414 177 -57.2% 
A. Civil or Criminal? 
Our basic strategy for unveiling judicial priorities is straightforward: 
observe the triage.104 Which kinds of cases tended to be cut from 
publication? Which kinds of cases tended to continue to be published? 
Although other breakdowns of the data are possible, we chose in this initial 
inquiry to examine two basic cuts: opinions in criminal versus civil cases, 
and opinions that affirmed as opposed to those that reversed the lower 
court. The simpler story, and where our discussion begins, is the comparison 
between criminal and civil cases. 
As the Introduction explains, we had predicted that the importance of 
public reasoning in criminal cases would lead judges to favor those cases 
when deciding which opinions to protect from the cuts. Yet, as Table 2 
shows, no district sought to preserve publication in criminal cases more than 
in civil cases. In the Third and Fourth Districts, the difference was small. 
But the other districts cut criminal opinions by considerably more than civil 
opinions. The First District (which includes Chicago) slashed criminal 
 
104 We borrow the metaphor of triage from COFFIN, supra note 7, and Vladeck & Gulati, 
supra note 7. 
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opinions by nearly thirty percentage points more than it did for civil 
opinions. (A former judge of the First District explained that its research 
division would often handle criminal appeals.)105 The Second District, 
which includes some of suburban Chicago, similarly cut criminal opinions 
by twenty more percentage points than it did for civil opinions.  
Overall, these courts seemed more willing to rein in publication in their 
criminal dockets than in their civil dockets. There are at least two possible, 
and compatible, explanations for this contrast.106 It may be that, as the 
formal criteria for publication were narrowed by the amendments to Rule 23 
(which emphasized precedential value, to the exclusion of other factors such 
as the public importance of the case or the presence of a dissent), a larger 
fraction of formerly publishable criminal opinions than of civil opinions was 
now disqualified from publication. Or it may be that the rule change and 
opinion limits caused the courts to internalize a generally higher bar for 
publication, and the share of opinions that no longer qualified under this 
new sense of publication-worthiness was greater among criminal cases than 
among civil cases. Either way, during the triage, a larger share of criminal 
cases than of civil cases was deemed sufficiently low-priority to be dropped 
from publication. 
B. Reversals or Affirmances? 
The most striking pattern in the data emerges from our analysis of the 
changes in the publication of affirmances and reversals. Figure 2 shows this 
pattern clearly in the aggregate data, but it can also be seen in breakdowns 
both by districts and by subject matter categories.  
Before the rule change, there was a clear, wide gap between the number 
of published affirmances and reversals: many more affirming opinions were 
being published. The number of opinions published then fell precipitously 
between the first and second halves of 1994 due to the policy shock. Figure 
2 shows that the rule change hit affirmances especially hard.107 
 
  
 
105 Telephone Interview by Johanna Hudgens with Gino L. DiVito, supra note 79. 
106 These theories and others are considered in greater detail infra Section III.D. 
107 See also infra Appendix Table 2 (showing that, by contrast, the overall ratio of all 
affirmances to all reversals remained largely unchanged). 
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Figure 2: Number of Published Opinions by Outcome,  
All Districts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
But just how far did the affirmances fall? No matter their starting points, 
immediately after the shock, affirmances and reversals tended to land at 
almost the same levels. Moreover, from that point forward, the number of 
affirmances often closely tracks the number of reversals.108 Notably, during 
the times when they diverged, affirmances tended to outpace reversals, 
rather than the other way around. 
 
 
108 It is worth repeating that our findings here concern the publication of decisions that 
affirm and decisions that reverse (and we are not making claims that merits outcomes changed, as 
the data suggest that this did not occur). 
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Figure 3: Number of Published Opinions by Outcome,  
Stable Sample of Judges 
 
Similar results are seen in the choices of our stable sample of judges. In 
the first half of 1994, this set of judges issued fifty percent more affirmances 
than reversals. In the second half of 1994, they issued virtually the same 
number of each. And in each successive period, the number of affirmances 
exceeded but remained close to the number of reversals. 
These findings are unsurprising in one sense: one ought to expect 
affirmances to fall more than reversals. After all, an affirmance indicates that 
the lower court handled the case correctly, suggesting little need for 
guidance on the matter.109 
But what is surprising is that the numbers of affirmances and reversals, 
once they fell, would land so close to each other. This is especially notable 
because they started off at such different quantities. This finding is no 
accident of aggregation, nor is it a quirk of the twenty-five judges in our 
subsample. Rather, it appears across districts as well as in our subject matter 
breakdowns. 
 
109 See supra note 48 (noting that key criteria for publication under the amended rule were 
whether the opinion established a new rule of law or modified an existing rule). 
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Figure 4: Number of Published Opinions by Type and Outcome,  
All Districts 
 
Figure 5: Number of Published Opinions by Type and Outcome,  
Stable Sample of Judges 
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Figures 4 and 5 correspond to Figures 2 and 3, respectively, showing 
changes within the distinct sets of civil and criminal cases. Evidently, the 
tendency of the courts to keep the volume of published affirmances in line 
with those of published reversals operates not only at the level of their total 
output, but also within both the criminal and the civil dockets.110  
The data thus reveal an unanticipated constraint—a sort of super-
priority—that seems to have operated not only at the aggregate level, but 
also within distinct categories of cases (and, as we will see, geographies). 
Why this seeming super-priority is so potent is the central mystery raised 
by this study. But its presence could clear up another puzzle: given the 
premise that the Illinois Supreme Court’s new criteria would drive the 
selection of opinions for publication, one might not have expected to see so 
many affirmances survive the cut while reversals were allowed to drop as far 
as they did. Reversals address issues on which appellate guidance is usually 
necessary and over which judges have already reached contradictory 
conclusions. Wouldn’t an appeals court, prioritizing this form of 
“selectivity,” naturally protect the publication of such opinions and instead 
choose not to publish affirmances?111 
The possibility of a super-priority helps explain why this intuitive 
expectation did not fully materialize: due to some external motivation, the 
volume of published affirmances was inflated to stay close to, or above, the 
volume of published reversals.  
We emphasize here the possibility that affirmances were inflated, and 
not that reversals were suppressed, because four of the five districts 
remained under the official publication limits for most of the post-shock 
study period. There was thus no formal pressure from these caps requiring 
the suppression of either published affirmances or reversals (with the 
possible exception of the Fourth District, where the official cap seemed 
relatively closer to binding). It does remain theoretically possible, however, 
to imagine that reversals were suppressed; for example, if one supposes that 
the courts were setting an implicit cap for themselves only as to the 
publication of affirmances, then our data could be read as showing that the 
courts were then suppressing reversals to stay close to, or under, that number.  
 
110 As we discuss below, focusing only on opinions reviewing decisions of the Industrial 
Commission (which operates the state’s system for workers’ compensation claims) shows a similar 
pattern. See infra Appendix Figure 4. 
111 It is true that some affirmances also address difficult questions and that some reversals 
simply correct factual errors that have little precedential value. Even so, one might have expected, 
as a general matter, that published affirmances would be the first thing to go. 
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C. The Five Districts 
Because the five judicial districts in Illinois varied in their starting 
points before the policy shock, in the caps assigned to them,112 and in other 
characteristics such as population and case composition, we also broke down 
the data by district. Aside from our desire to see how regularly this pattern 
occurred from court to court, we were also concerned that the patterns 
observed in the aggregate might have been unduly influenced by a single 
dominant district (such as the First District, which includes Chicago) or by 
a set of similar districts (such as the Fourth and Fifth Districts, which 
include more rural portions of southern Illinois). In fact, the pattern 
persisted across all the districts and, in some cases, even operated at the 
level of individual judges.113 
Figure 6: Number of Published Opinions by Outcome,  
First District 
 
 
 
112 See supra Table 1 (listing the number of opinions published in each district in 1993 and the 
caps that they were assigned in 1994). 
113 See infra Appendix Figures 5A-5D (charting results of individual judges in the Fifth 
District). 
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The First District, the largest of all five districts, showed a pattern that 
largely mirrored our aggregate results: a wide gap between published 
reversals and affirmances in each case category prior to the rule change, 
followed by a precipitous drop in published affirmances but falling only to 
the level of published reversals (which also fell, but not as sharply). 
Figure 7: Number of Published Opinions by Outcome,  
Second District 
 
 
In the Second District, as in our aggregate results, the gap between 
published affirmances and reversals narrowed after the rule change, but the 
two categories alternated in outpacing each other. 
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Figure 7A: Number of Published Opinions by Type and Outcome,  
Second District 
 
A further breakdown of the Second District’s data into criminal and civil 
dockets more clearly reveals what was happening. Figure 7A shows that, in 
the Second District’s criminal cases, the number of published affirmances 
closely tracks the number of published reversals in each six-month period 
following the rule change. It is only in the civil docket that the court 
seemed more willing to allow the number of published reversals to 
noticeably exceed affirmances in some periods. 
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Figure 8: Number of Published Opinions by Outcome,  
Third District 
 
Figure 9: Number of Published Opinions by Outcome,  
Fourth District 
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Figures 8 and 9 show that the Third and Fourth Districts also exhibited 
patterns consistent with the hypothesized super-priority. In the Third 
District, published affirmances were already declining before the policy 
shock. The decline was apparently intentional, as this court seems to have 
anticipated the changes to Rule 23.114 Nonetheless, both affirmances and 
reversals dropped sharply at the moment of the policy shock. What is 
notable here is not the anticipatory decline of published affirmances, but 
that quantity’s sudden leveling and mirroring of the post-shock levels of 
published reversals.  
The results in the Fourth District also reflect key characteristics of the 
dominant pattern. First, there is a sharp fall in both reversals and 
affirmances at the point of the policy shock that closes the original gap 
between them. Beyond that point, the number of published affirmances 
tended to stay close to, or else to exceed by a small margin, the number of 
published reversals. 
Figure 10: Number of Published Opinions by Outcome,  
Fifth District 
 
 
114 The Third District seems to have anticipated at least the change in Rule 23, if not the 
caps and page limits in M.R. No. 10343. As Judge McCuskey of that district put it, “[p]rior to the 
supreme court’s amendment of Rule 23, our court had already scrutinized the rule’s publication 
requirement. As a result, we reduced the number of opinions filed by our district from 349 in 1992 
to 272 in 1993.” See McCuskey, supra note 76, at 4. He also noted, however, that “a further 
reduction to 150 published opinions may appear drastic.” Id.  
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Like the other districts, the number of published affirmances in the 
Fifth District tracks the number of published reversals. But the Fifth 
District differs from its counterparts in one notable aspect: The “tracking” 
behavior is not limited to the time period following the rule change. Rather, 
the Fifth District seemed to have kept a fairly even balance of published 
affirmances and published reversals even before the policy shock. This close 
tracking throughout the study period is evident even in the publication 
patterns of certain individual judges.115 By the end of the study period, 
however, the close tracking seen in the Fifth District falls apart; at that 
point, more than any other district, the Fifth District no longer held 
published affirmances at approximately the level of published reversals. 
D. Interpretations and Implications 
Our observations of how the Illinois appellate courts triaged their 
opinion-writing reveal not only which types of opinions the courts 
prioritized for publication but also suggest what these courts saw as being at 
stake in their publication choices. Our findings also suggest that these 
courts understood that their “medium” of judicial expression was not 
confined to the immediate content of their written opinions—but rather 
extended to the visible corpus of their decisions taken as a whole.  
1. Observing the Triage 
Consider first the basic criminal–civil comparison. Our data show that 
the share of criminal opinions deemed sufficiently low-priority to be cut 
from publication under the new rules was greater than the share of civil 
opinions.116 This differential ran against our original expectations; we had 
predicted that the importance of public reasoning about criminal 
punishment would lead the courts to more avidly protect the publication of 
those opinions.117 But there were also good reasons, as noted above, to 
 
115 See infra Appendix Figures 5A-5D (showing data for the four judges in the Fifth District 
who sat during the entire study period). We must emphasize that the tracking pattern is not 
evident for every individual judge—even in districts such as the Fifth District where the aggregate 
numbers show a close balance throughout. (That is, idiosyncratic variations among the judges in 
such a district averaged out into a clearer overall tracking pattern.) And it goes without saying that 
we are not claiming that these four judges are a representative sample of the Fifth District (much 
less of any other district). 
116 For a refinement of this interpretation, see the discussion in the Conclusion. 
117 We also knew that the Illinois courts already accorded precedence to criminal cases in 
procedural matters, such as in scheduling oral arguments. See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 611 (noting that in 
the “sequence and manner of calling cases for oral argument[,] . . . priority shall be given to 
appeals in criminal cases over appeals in civil cases”). While precedence in procedural handling 
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expect that these courts might instead favor civil opinions for preservation: 
These criminal appeals may have raised repetitive issues or turned on 
factual matters subject to high levels of deference, whereas the civil docket 
may have been more varied and thus may have raised more new or unsettled 
legal issues requiring appellate explication.  
It is a more obvious case that reversals should have been favored over 
affirmances for protection from the publication cuts, as was observed: 
Reversals present cases in which judicial colleagues have already disagreed 
and on matters in which the lower courts evidently require further 
guidance. Thus, reversals seem naturally more likely to survive under the 
more selective standards for publication, which focus on precedential value.118 
What such a simple story of priorities among types of cases cannot 
easily explain, however, is the pattern seen in Figures 2 to 10: Across 
districts and across categories, immediately after the policy change, the 
number of published affirmances and reversals each fell from different levels 
and yet landed at virtually the same place, and then stayed roughly 
balanced. What could account for this unexpected, persistent pattern?  
One explanation might be that such a balance is a natural byproduct of 
the newly selective criteria for publication: these courts began to limit 
publication to mainly “hard cases,”119 which one might expect to fall roughly 
half as reversals and half as affirmances.120 We find this possibility 
 
need not translate into selection of published opinions, we also speculated that the former might 
be a proxy for a deeper priority that would so translate. For additional examples of precedence for 
criminal cases in appellate procedure, see U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, FIFTH CIRCUIT, PLAN 
FOR EXPEDITING CRIMINAL APPEALS 3 (2008) (“This court gives criminal appeals the highest 
priority in screening, calendaring, and decision.”); id. (“By court policy, each judge must give 
direct criminal cases priority in the preparation and publication of opinions over all other cases 
except previously submitted direct criminal cases.”). Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2102 (2012) (“Criminal cases 
on review from the States courts shall have priority, on the docket of the Supreme Court, over all 
cases except cases to which the United States is a party and such other cases as the court may 
decide to be of public importance.”); FED. R. APP. P. 45(b)(2) (“In placing cases on the calendar 
for argument, the clerk must give preference to appeals in criminal cases and to other proceedings 
and appeals entitled to preference by law.”). 
118 The rule change limited publication primarily to those cases which “establishe[d] a new 
rule of law or modifie[d], explain[ed] or criticize[d] an existing rule of law.” ILL. SUP. CT. R. 23(a). 
119 We use the terms “easy” and “hard” cases in the familiar sense. For a recent critical 
analysis of the terminology, see Frederick Schauer, Legal Realism Untamed, 91 TEX. L. REV. 749 
(2013). For classic expositions, see Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1975); 
Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639 
(2003); Kent Greenawalt, Discretion and Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters That Bind 
Judges, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 359 (1975); Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 
(1985); Patricia M. Wald, Some Thoughts on Judging as Gleaned from One Hundred Years of the 
Harvard Law Review and Other Great Books, 100 HARV. L. REV. 887 (1987). 
120 The emergence of this balance might bring the Priest–Klein hypothesis to mind. See 
George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 
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intriguing, but it cannot be a complete account of our observations.121 The 
reason is that our findings reflect more than a rough balance between 
affirmances and reversals. What we seem to see, in many time periods—
across districts, case types, and even some individual judges—is a tight 
tracking pattern, suggesting the active, continuous management of the 
balance. Furthermore, under a basic hard cases explanation, we should also 
expect deviations due to noise to favor reversals as often as affirmances—but 
instead, the data show that where they diverge, affirmances outpace 
reversals much more often than the other way around. 
It remains possible, of course, that these courts began by largely limiting 
their publications to hard cases—but also actively sought to prevent the 
volume of published affirmances from falling noticeably below the volume 
of published reversals. Although future work more closely analyzing the 
content of these published opinions may shed more light on the extent to 
which these courts were publishing mainly the hard cases,122 some further 
clues from our current data also suggest that the hard cases explanation is 
not the whole story.123 One might assume, for instance, that the presence of 
 
19-20 (1984) (explaining that as the number of cases selected for trial approaches zero, a plaintiff’s 
rate of success approaches fifty percent). In our setting, what is being selected is opinions for 
publication, rather than cases for trial. The analogous intuition here is more easily and suitably 
expressed as the possibility that what is left (after the policy shock) are the “hard cases,” which 
tend to fall half as reversals and half as affirmances. 
121 One might imagine other such even-split stories involving more complex mechanisms, 
including strategic behavior or bargaining, but the evaluation of such hypotheses is beyond the 
reach of this study. See, e.g., Wald, supra note 18, at 1374 (“I have seen judges purposely 
compromise on an unpublished decision incorporating an agreed-upon result in order to avoid a 
time-consuming public debate about what law controls. I have even seen wily would-be dissenters 
go along with a result they do not like so long as it is not elevated to a precedent.”).  
122 We note that such a pattern is not generally evident in other contexts in which one might 
expect it to operate, such as other appeals courts. See, e.g., Caseload Highlights, CT. STAT. PROJECT 
(Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, Williamsburg, Va.), March 2007, available at http://www.ncsc.org/ 
Services-and-Experts/Areas-of-expertise/Appellate-justice.aspx (showing an overall thirty percent 
reversal rate for decisions made by state intermediate appellate courts). 
123 In addition to the incidence of separate opinions (i.e., concurrences and dissents), as 
explained in the text, one might imagine several other indicators of the difficulty of a case. These 
include opinion length (in words) and the number of citations contained within an opinion. Both 
of these measures, however, are likely confounded by the new limits on opinion length imposed by 
M.R. No. 10343. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text. Yet another proxy for such hard 
cases, or for cases that present questions of precedential value, may be the standard of review used 
by the appellate court—but our review of a sample of published opinions suggests that the 
standard is not consistently reported. 
We also considered using oral argument as a signal of the relative importance or difficulty of 
the legal issues at stake in a case. Unlike other jurisdictions, however, the decisions of Illinois’s 
appellate courts, as reported by Westlaw, did not indicate whether oral argument was held. We 
likewise considered future citations to a given opinion, but such observations would have been 
confounded by the overall reduction in available citable precedent (due to the policy shock). 
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a concurrence or dissent serves as a signal of a hard case.124 We found a 
greater incidence of such separate opinions among reversals than we did 
among affirmances—not the roughly equal incidence that one might have 
expected based on a hard cases explanation alone.125 More tellingly, although 
we generally found increases in the share of opinions with a concurrence or 
dissent, these increases did not occur in the pattern that a hard-cases 
mechanism operating alone would have implied.126 
2. Concerning Appearances 
A further theory is thus needed. We interpret the unusual and persistent 
pattern observed as suggesting that these appeals courts were acting on a 
super-priority—manifest in the aim of publishing at least as many 
affirmances as reversals—while they also sought to limit the number of 
opinions published altogether. The result of these competing pressures was 
that published affirmances and published reversals often closely tracked 
 
124 See Wald, supra note 18, at 1412-15 (describing the motivations of judges to write 
concurring or dissenting opinions); see also Diane P. Wood, When to Hold, When to Fold, When to 
Reshuffle: The Art of Decisionmaking on a Multi-Member Court, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1445, 1451-57 
(2012) (noting the considerations that prompt judges to publish separate opinions). 
125 It is possible, of course, that concurrences and dissents are more likely to be written in 
reversals rather than affirmances. For instance, the existence of the lower court’s opinion may 
make the authorship of a separate opinion less costly; or, the collegiality costs of a separate 
opinion may be lower because a dissent in a reversal agrees with the trial judge unlike a dissent in 
an affirmance. If there is such a differential, then it is hard to draw conclusions based on the first 
clue noted in the text. The following analysis, however, which focuses on changes across the policy 
shock rather than absolute levels, is more robust to this potential confounding factor. 
126 Specifically, the increases in the shares of published opinions that include a concurrence, 
a dissent, or both should be greater for affirmances than for reversals, given how much farther 
affirmances fell. (That is, the denominator, or the total number of affirmances or reversals 
published, fell farther for affirmances than for reversals; meanwhile, the numerators for each, or 
the number of published decisions including a separate opinion, presumably should not have 
changed as much, if the hard cases were being preserved for publication.) But we found no 
noteworthy difference between the increase for affirmances and the increase for reversals. 
On this point, however, it is worth noting that before the rule change, any case for which a 
concurrence or dissent was written was presumptively publishable. The 1994 amendments 
eliminated this presumption. Given that the presence of a concurrence or dissent no longer 
equates to automatic publication, then the increased frequency we have observed may be 
understating the increase in the incidence of “hard cases” in the body of published opinions after 
the shock as compared to before. Note that such a distortion could in theory undermine the 
conclusion we are drawing from our comparisons of this metric among reversals and among 
affirmances—but only if this distortion were for some reason stronger for affirmances than for 
reversals (so that our comparison understates the change in average incidence of “hard cases” 
among affirmances more than among reversals). 
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each other in number. (As noted above, we take care not to overstate the 
rigidity of this heuristic.)127 
To the extent that these appeals courts were influenced by a general 
reluctance to allow the volume of affirmances to fall below the volume of 
reversals in their visible corpus of published opinions, we speculate that this 
aim was likely motivated by institutional concerns for signaling judicial 
quality and a desire to preserve collegiality—a set of motivations one might 
call reproach-aversion.128  
If published opinions were lopsided in favor of reversals, they might 
have created a perception that the trial courts were not getting the job 
done.129 The “collective reputation” of the judiciary would suffer and so 
might the relations between the appeals judges and the trial judges.130 
 
127 Indeed, as we have already noted, the careful balance between publishing reversals and 
publishing affirmances that existed in the Fifth District for much of our study period seems to 
have unraveled by the end. See supra Figure 10. And in the Second District, although the tracking 
of affirmances and reversals is extremely tight in the criminal docket, it is quite loose in the civil 
docket. See supra Figure 7A. As also noted, we have observed this tracking pattern for some 
individual judges (and to varying degrees), but not for others. 
128 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
129 Court observers routinely use reversal rates only among published opinions to measure 
the quality of a particular court. See, e.g., JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., STATEWIDE CASELOAD 
TRENDS: 2013 COURT STATISTICS REPORT, 2002–2003 THROUGH 2011–2012, at xvi-xvii (2013) 
(tracking reversal rates only among cases disposed of by written opinion); Roy E. Hofer, Supreme 
Court Reversal Rates: Evaluating the Federal Courts of Appeals, LANDSLIDE, Jan.–Feb. 2010, at 8, 8 
(using reversal rates among Supreme Court opinions to “grade” the federal circuit courts); Brad 
Pauley, The California Supreme Court’s 2010 Affirmance Rates in Civil Cases Reveal Change and 
Continuity, AT LECTERN: PRACTICING BEFORE CAL. SUP. CT. (Apr. 28, 2011, 8:35 PM), 
http://www.atthelectern.com/the-california-supreme-courts-2010-affirmance-rates-in-civil-cases-
reveal-change-and-continuity, archived at http://perma.cc/3YKF-ANVJ (discussing the California 
Supreme Court’s affirmance rates on review of civil cases from the various intermediate appellate 
courts in 2010).  
To be clear, we do not mean to endorse such statistics as measures of quality. For example, 
the typical focus on reversal rates in published Supreme Court opinions ignores factors such as 
certiorari procedures and other selective processes that precede the Court’s decisions. But 
regardless of the accuracy of such measures, we hypothesize that it is the salience of the published 
opinions that drives our suggested super-priority in the case of the Illinois appeals courts.  
130 See Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Audiences and Reputation: Perspectives from 
Comparative Law, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 451, 453 (2009) (explaining “collective 
reputation” in terms of “a judiciary that operates effectively [and thus earns] respect as a unit 
within its own political system”); id. at 455 (“Each individual judge cares about his reputation with 
the relevant audiences, but also about the reputation of the group as a whole . . . with external 
constituencies. Collective reputation determines the status of the judiciary within the relevant 
audience . . . .”); id. at 459 (“These constituencies might include the bar, academic 
commentators, other branches of government, as well as political parties and others . . . .”). In 
our context, we are describing the possibility that an appeals court might actively play a role in 
influencing the collective reputation of the trial courts it oversees. 
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Consider the unenviable position of those Illinois appeals judges who 
sought to avoid creating such a perception of a weak trial bench. The true 
affirmance rate was relatively high—above seventy percent.131 Yet this true 
rate was obscured by the use of unpublished decisions, which at the time 
were practically inaccessible to anyone not involved in the case itself (in 
contrast to today’s easy online access to so-called unpublished opinions).  
The frequency of affirmances among published opinions was thus far 
more salient. But it was also likely to be lower than the (virtually invisible) 
true affirmance rate because the criteria for publication tended to favor 
reversals. Before the rule change, the appeals courts could nevertheless 
signal the quality of the lower courts by choosing to publish—and thus 
make visible—a large number of affirmances. Under the new rules, however, 
the appeals courts became more limited in their ability to continue in this 
practice. Still, at the very least, they could try to avoid the appearance that 
trial court decisions were wrong more often than right. That is, the appeals 
courts could still publish enough affirmances, as a sort of “filler,” so as to 
prevent the number of published affirmances from falling below the number 
of published reversals.132 One might even speculate that the caps imposed 
 
131 Note that, in some quarters, even an 86% affirmance rate might be seen as a bad signal 
about the quality of the trial bench. As Judge Jon Newman noted in the context of the federal 
Second Circuit in the 1990s, “[a] district judge expressed the view that the reported rate of 
appellate reversals, most recently said to be about 14%, demonstrated that something was seriously 
wrong. As he put it, either the district judges are not doing their jobs properly (by making too 
many errors) or the circuit judges are not doing their jobs properly (by reversing too many 
decisions that are not erroneous).” Newman, supra note 103, at 630-31. 
132 Such publication of extra opinions as “filler” would, of course, tend to undermine the 
rationale for the rule change in the first place. Recall that a primary justification offered by 
members of Illinois Supreme Court for the 1994 rule change was that the “avalanche of opinions” 
taxed the capacity of the bar and imposed real costs in terms of legal research. Illinois Supreme 
Court Administrative Order, M.R. No. 10343 (1994) (Bilandic, C.J., writing in support); id. 
(Heiple, J., writing in support). 
The costs of over-publication may be familiar to readers from the controversy over the 
citation of unpublished decisions in the federal courts. Judge Kozinski, for instance, has lamented 
the publication (for citation) of decisions that may not have received the same care and attention 
as other published opinions. In addition to echoing the concerns raised by the Illinois Supreme 
Court, he notes that such opinions, which are “often drafted entirely by law clerks and staff 
attorneys” or “converted bench memo[s],” can be “highly misleading source[s] of authority.” 
Letter from Alex Kozinski, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, to Samuel 
A. Alito, Jr., Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 4-6, 9-10, 11-13 ( Jan. 16, 
2004), available at http://www.nonpublication.com/kozinskiletter.pdf (citing, among other things, 
Alex Kozinski & Stephen Reinhardt, Please Don’t Cite This!: Why We Don’t Allow Citation to 
Unpublished Opinions, CAL. LAW., June 2000, at 43, 44 and Unpublished Judicial Opinions: Hearing 
Before the H.R. Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
107th Cong. 12-13 (2002) (prepared statement of Hon. Alex Kozinski, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit)). 
  
1758 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 163: 1719 
 
by M.R. No. 10343 gave the appeals courts an implicit sense of license to 
publish extra affirmances up to the numerical cap.133 
Notably, such a perception-management account may help explain why 
the super-priority appears to have operated with greater force in the 
criminal docket, at least in the Second District. If a court cared more about 
perceptions of quality of the criminal justice machinery, then it might have 
given greater care to matching the volume of affirmances to reversals among 
published opinions in the criminal docket.  
More generally, the tending of appearances in this way may have served, 
in part, a legitimizing function that would otherwise have been served more 
directly by actually publishing opinions—that is, by public reasoning—a 
preferred method that had become more constrained under the amended 
regime.134 If so, one might interpret such a substitution as a pragmatic 
adaptation in judicial expression, a shift from substance toward form. 
3. Collegiality and the Judicial Audience 
A closely related set of further motivations may be grouped under the 
heading of “collegiality.”135 Trial judges do not like being reversed,136 and 
they surely like it even less when a reversal comes in the form of a 
published opinion that names them individually and spells out their 
mistakes in detail.137 How much more vexing it would be for the trial judges 
if most of the opinions chosen for publication were reversals—while 
 
133 Recall that these courts generally published significantly fewer opinions than the caps set 
by the Illinois Supreme Court. See supra Section I.C. 
134 Cf. Abner J. Mikva, For Whom Judges Write, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1357, 1364-66 (1988) 
(describing the varied audiences to and purposes for which judges write). 
135 We do not mean to imply that these are competing or mutually exclusive explanations. 
To the contrary, these explanations are closely intertwined and together form the “appearances” 
super-priority that we have described above. 
136 Such “reversal aversion” has been widely studied in the context of the federal courts. See 
Choi et al., supra note 7, at 519-25 (surveying literature on what they term “reversal aversion” 
among trial judges); id. at 518-19 (“Reversal is also potentially embarrassing and detrimental to a 
trial judge’s prospects of promotion to the appeals courts.”). 
137 Notably, in the tables listing unpublished decisions during the period we study, the trial 
judge is not identified. A trial judge’s potential sensitivity to being reversed by name is reflected 
in what Judge Patricia Wald described a “prevailing decorum” early in her career as a federal 
appeals judge: “[I]f we upheld a trial judge, we referred to her by name; if we reversed the judge, 
we left him anonymous.” Wald, supra note 18, at 1382. More generally, on the risk to collegiality 
between appeals and trial judges due to reversals, see, for example, Newman, supra note 103, at 629 
(“There is . . . an undeniable basis for some tension between judges of trial and appellate courts, 
borne of the structural relationship in which they both function. Appellate judges have jurisdiction 
to reverse the judgments entered by trial judges. When that authority is exercised, the potential 
arises for some strain upon the normally cordial relationships between trial and appellate 
judges.”). 
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affirmances (which are in fact the vast majority of decisions) were hidden in 
unpublished dispositions. Further motivating the aim of at least matching 
published affirmances to published reversals, then, might be a concern for 
preserving collegial relations between the trial and appellate judges in each 
judicial district.138 
Such collegiality-based motivations may also help explain why the 
tracking pattern persists within certain breakdowns: These categories might 
also map onto distinct “audiences” of judicial colleagues. That is, the appeals 
court may be seeking to reassure specific groups of colleagues that they are 
managing appearances in a way that promotes positive public perceptions of 
each of those groups.139  
For example, consider the subset of appeals that come from decisions of 
the Industrial Commission, Illinois’s workers’ compensation system. Rather 
than speaking to the trial courts, these appellate opinions speak directly to 
the Industrial Commission—a distinct “audience.” And indeed, this small 
 
138 Implied in this account is the perceived possibility of a “collegial cost” to an appeals court 
that publishes reversals too frequently relative to affirmances (a cost to vertical collegiality 
between the appellate and trial judges), as other scholars have studied about dissenting (a cost to 
horizontal collegiality among appellate judges). See generally Epstein et al., supra note 29, at 103 
(describing such a “collegial cost” from dissenting that manifests as “dissent aversion” among 
appeals judges). 
One might also imagine further variations of such a perceived cost to making trial judges look 
bad through infelicitous publication choices. For example, the fact that the judges of the trial and 
appellate courts in Illinois are elected might raise the stakes for managing perceptions of the trial 
bench or of particular trial judges or for maintaining collegiality among judges. The influence of 
such electoral politics may be dampened, however, by the fact that retention elections for these 
judges (which happen every six years for the trial judges and every ten years for the appeals 
judges) are uncontested and are generally understood to be of little risk for the incumbent. See 
ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 12(d); Larry Aspin, Judicial Retention Election Trends: 1964–2006, 90 
JUDICATURE 208, 209 tbl. 1 (2007). Future work that includes data on the party affiliations of the 
trial and appellate judges during this period may be able to test for same- and cross-party effects. 
It is, however, telling that the super-priority we generally observe can also specifically be seen in 
the subsample of cases appealed from rulings of the Industrial Commission, whose members are 
appointed and not elected. See infra note 140 and accompanying text.  
139 Our account thus engages both “internal” and “external” audiences, or what one might 
call “primary” and “secondary” audiences: the appeals court wishes to be seen by their trial court 
colleagues (an internal or primary audience) as managing outward appearances (as perceived by 
external or secondary audiences such as the bar or even the broader public). See Ruggiero J. 
Aldisert et al., Opinion Writing and Opinion Readers, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 17-20 (2009) 
(describing an appellate court’s “primary” audiences as the parties and the trial court involved in a 
reviewed case, and “secondary” audiences as potentially the broader judiciary, other political 
institutions, the bar, academia, and the public); Garoupa & Ginsburg, supra note 130, at 453 
(describing “internal” audiences as “within the judiciary itself” and “external” as including 
“lawyers, the media, or the general public”). 
  
1760 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 163: 1719 
 
subset of appellate opinions exhibits a similar pattern, suggesting that the 
super-priority is at work here too.140 
Likewise, for our criminal–civil distinction: Some of the trial-court 
circuits employ a system in which criminal cases are directed to one set of 
trial judges, and civil cases to another set.141 The distinction is formalized in 
some trial-court circuits through the creation of a particular “criminal 
division” of trial judges.142 In others, the separation is more informal, with 
some trial judges hearing only one class of cases.143 But regardless of its 
form, such division of cases creates distinct audiences of trial judges for the 
appeals courts to consider when weighing collegiality concerns.144 The 
existence of distinct audiences may thus help explain why the super-priority 
seems to hold within our two major categories, as well as why we observe 
the pattern repeated district by district. 
CONCLUSION: SPILLOVERS IN JUDICIAL CHOICES 
Our study suggests that for the sake of appearances the Illinois appellate 
courts sought to balance their publication of reversals and of affirmances. If 
so, then the choice to publish a given decision may have depended not only 
on the qualities of that case alone, but also on which other cases had already 
been published and, specifically, on how many were reversals and how many 
were affirmances. The appearances super-priority thus implies spillover 
effects among the courts’ publication choices in otherwise unrelated cases.145  
 
140 See Appendix Figure 4. In fact, appeals from the Industrial Commission are heard by a 
panel of diverse judges chosen from across the districts. That is, such a case might heard by a panel 
comprised of a First, Third, and Fourth District judge, for example. This structure suggests one possible 
mechanism by which the super-priority described above might have spread across the districts. 
141 See, e.g., STATE OF ILL., CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, Judges Information, 
http://www.cookcountycourt.org/aboutthecourt/JudgesInformation.aspx (last visited May 11, 
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/AP9M-KBLW (noting several “divisions” and the related 
assignment of judges). 
142 See, e.g., id. (showing a criminal division in the Circuit Court of Cook Country). 
143 See, e.g., STATE OF ILLINOIS, FOURTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, SECOND AMENDED 
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER, available at http://www.fourthcircuitil.com/news/10-1.php (providing 
judicial assignments and noting the types of cases assigned to each judge). Note that the Fourth 
Circuit of trial courts is distinct from the Fourth District of the appeals courts. 
144 One might also imagine that the courts are monitoring this norm within only one 
category (say, criminal) as well as for the total corpus of opinions. This approach could generate a 
similar pattern in the remaining (civil) category. If so, however, we might expect to see the latter 
category (civil) occasionally having more reversals than affirmances, as it can absorb the occasional 
excess of affirmances created by the first category. But we have not noticed this alternative pattern 
in the data. 
145 Two further forms of such interdependency are more obvious than the one revealed in 
this study. First, that time constraints mean that the time spent on one opinion cannot be spent on 
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Such a spillover would alter how we interpret the judicial choices we 
observe. In fact, it would unsettle our own earlier conclusions in this study. 
Recall our original finding that more criminal cases than civil cases appear 
to have been deemed low-priority for publication under the new rules.146 
But now consider the possible influence of the super-priority: what if the 
number of opinions we observed being published were inflated by the 
inclusion of affirmances serving only as filler? What really should be 
compared as between criminal and civil cases, then, would be the 
publication of reversals only.147 Through that more refined lens, we would 
see that in all districts the publication of criminal reversals does in fact drop 
disproportionately relative to that of civil reversals.148  
But the implications of such a spillover go beyond matters of 
interpretation. Whenever published reversals began to outnumber 
published affirmances, these courts faced an unpalatable choice. At that 
point, these courts could either dilute the case law with more affirmances 
and thereby subvert the high court’s command to be selective about 
publication, or they could suppress the publication of further reversals and 
thereby create an artificial drag on the development of case law.  
Either choice may have been preferable, however, to the more troubling 
spillover effect suggested in the Introduction. These courts could have 
satisfied their higher-level priorities of selectivity and of appearances by 
sacrificing accuracy instead—that is, by publishing only case-law-worthy 
opinions, while switching some of those reversals to affirmances. The reason 
these courts could hold fast to the super-priority of accuracy, and avoid 
managing appearances by distorting actual outcomes among the cases set for 
publication, is the strong asymmetry of visibility that existed at the time 
between published and unpublished decisions of these courts. The truly 
unavailable nature of the unpublished opinions allowed these courts to 
decouple accuracy from appearances, in deploying the judicial medium. By 
contrast, today’s so-called unpublished opinions are widely available in the 
 
another; and second, that if one opinion on a given legal issue is published, then a second case 
addressing the same issue may become redundant. 
146 Or more precisely, that a larger share of opinions in criminal cases were disqualified by 
the higher bar for publication.  
147 The reason is that the super-priority implies that observing the number of published 
affirmances may not be informative about the relative publication-worthiness of civil versus 
criminal cases. 
148 This conclusion would be narrower because we would no longer be drawing conclusions 
about affirmances, and thus, no longer about the priorities put on criminal versus civil opinions as 
a whole. One exception should be noted, however, in the Fourth District: to the extent that its 
formal cap actually constrained its publication choices, then this shift of attention to data solely 
about the reversals would not be necessary. 
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federal courts and in many state courts. Such universal visibility may have 
its advantages, but in theory it may also force the tradeoff between accuracy 
and appearances—implying the possibility of spillovers across the actual 
outcomes of cases. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix Table 1: Annual Reports of the Illinois Courts and 
Westlaw Data, 1991–1997 
 
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Annual Reports  
of the Illinois Courts 
Opinions 2284 2234 2196 1678 1070 1098 1006 
Rule 23 
Orders 
3380 3331 3592 4558 4696 4421 4805 
Summary 
Orders 
— — — — 992 1105 816 
Total 5664 5565 5788 6236 6758 6624 6627 
Westlaw Dataset 
Opinions 2007 1971 1899 1436 946 958 885 
Table 
Decisions 
3323 3245 3499 4318 5392 5165 5257 
Total 5330 5216 5398 5754 6338 6123 6142 
Westlaw Total as a  
Percent of Reported Total 
94.1 93.7 93.3 92.3 93.8 92.4 92.7 
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Appendix Figure 1: Number of Total Dispositions,  
All Districts 
 
Appendix Figure 2: Dispositions by Outcome (as Percent of Total),  
All Districts 
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Appendix Figure 3: Publication Rate (by Outcome), 
All Districts 
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Appendix Table 2: Change in Published Opinions by Outcome 
  Before After Changes 
All Districts Affirmances 3412 1487 -56.4% 
Reversals (Whole or Partial) 2394 1329 -44.6% 
1st District Affirmances 1580 816 -48.4% 
Reversals (Whole or Partial) 977 645 -34.0% 
2nd District Affirmances 613 233 -62.0% 
Reversals (Whole or Partial) 470 252 -46.4% 
3rd District Affirmances 430 133 -69.1% 
Reversals (Whole or Partial) 317 129 -59.3% 
4th District Affirmances 485 211 -56.5% 
Reversals (Whole or Partial) 337 165 -51.0% 
5th District Affirmances 304 94 -69.1% 
Reversals (Whole or Partial) 296 138 -53.4% 
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Appendix Table 3: Change in Published Affirmances by Case Type 
 Affirmance Type Before After Changes 
All Districts Criminal 1340 440 -67.2% 
Civil 2072 1047 -49.5% 
1st District Criminal 640 208 -67.5% 
Civil 940 608 -35.3% 
2nd District Criminal 267 77 -71.2% 
Civil 346 156 -54.9% 
3rd District Criminal 167 47 -71.9% 
Civil  263 86 -67.3% 
4th District Criminal 163 86 -47.2% 
Civil  322 125 -61.2% 
5th District Criminal 103 22 -78.6% 
Civil  201 72 -64.2% 
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Appendix Table 4: Change in Published Reversals by Case Type 
 Reversal Type Before After Changes 
All Districts Criminal 806 347 -56.9% 
Civil 1591 982 -38.3% 
1st District Criminal 313 163 -47.9% 
Civil 664 482 -27.4% 
2nd District Criminal 166 65 -60.8% 
Civil 304 187 -38.5% 
3rd District Criminal 123 43 -65.0% 
Civil 194 86 -55.7% 
4th District Criminal 120 43 -64.2% 
Civil 217 122 -43.8% 
5th District Criminal 84 33 -60.7% 
Civil 212 105 -50.5% 
 
Appendix Figure 4: Number of Published Opinions by Outcome,  
Appeals from the Industrial Commission 
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Appendix Figure 5A: Number of Published Opinions by Outcome, Judge A 
(Fifth District) 
 
Appendix Figure 5B: Number of Published Opinions by Outcome, Judge B 
(Fifth District) 
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Appendix Figure 5C: Number of Published Opinions by Outcome, Judge C 
(Fifth District) 
 
Appendix Figure 5D: Number of Published Opinions by Outcome, Judge D 
(Fifth District) 
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